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FINANCIAL SERVICESIn the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, many efforts are under way to improve the stability
and resilience of the global financial system. One particular solution is to manage the risk of
default in securities markets through so-called central counterparties (CCPs), institutions that
interpose themselves between counterparties in financial transactions. This Commentary offers a
new look at what these institutions can achieve in the context of derivatives and short-term
funding markets. It places the emphasis on the core services a CCP provides: the diversification
of counterparty risk and the redistribution of default losses among its members.
For derivatives markets, this perspective opens up an avenue for also including customized
derivative products in CCP clearing, which is crucial to avoid future episodes of instability in the
financial system. CCP clearing needs to concentrate more on insuring against counterparty
default, not merely on ensuring proper risk management and valuation of contracts, which
presumes a high degree of standardization of financial derivatives. As argued in the Commentary,
such a shift would put more emphasis on how the design of a CCP can avoid adverse effects on
market discipline once insurance against counterparty risk has been introduced.
For short-term financing markets, this Commentarypoints out that the case for a CCP is less clear,
as most transactions are backed by high-quality collateral. Nonetheless, the current move toward
a CCP in Canada could be seen as a market-based solution that would prevent a collapse in short-
term funding for financial institutions in times of a crisis. But this potential solution is not
foolproof: CCPs themselves can fail, in which case governments may feel compelled to bail them
out because of their systemic importance. This raises the challenge of how to balance the benefits
of a CCP in terms of enhanced financial stability with how much risk the central bank or the
government is willing to bear in backing up, implicitly or explicitly, a CCP’s liquidity needs 
or losses.
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The
Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy
staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s individual and
corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country.




is Associate Professor and
RBC Fellow, Department
of Economics, Queen’s
University and a Member
of the C.D. Howe
Institute’s Monetary
Policy Council. 
Rigorous external review 
of every major policy study,
undertaken by academics 
and outside experts, helps
ensure the quality,
integrity and objectivity 





THE STUDY IN BRIEFCommentary 329 | 1
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
T
he financial crisis of 2007 and
2008 has moved the importance
of proper clearing arrangements
for financial trades from the obscurity
of back offices into the limelight of
policymakers. Differences in how
financial markets fared, especially in
the wake of the Lehman Brothers
default in the fall of 2008, are stunning.
On the one hand, trading on central marketplaces
like stock and derivative exchanges continued in
the usual orderly fashion, despite sharp falls in
asset values and increased volatility. On the other
hand, markets where trading takes place on a
bilateral, ad-hoc basis – such as over-the-counter
(OTC), interbank and repo markets – went into a
deep freeze: trading stopped, and it took almost a
full year and multiple interventions by central
banks and treasury departments around the world
to restore somewhat orderly trading.
A prime suspect for this markedly different
performance is readily identified: the presence or
absence of a proper clearing infrastructure. When
trades take place on an exchange, they normally
come with a fixed, mandated arrangement offered
by a clearing house to manage the obligations
from the trade. This process begins with
establishing, reconciling and often making public
the trade information, continues with the
management of the risks associated with the
counterparties and their financial trade, and is
finalized with the settlement of the trade.
Such arrangements are limited in markets with
bilateral trading where transactions are privately
negotiated, often customized to the needs of the
counterparties and without formal clearing
provisions. Hence, these markets are prone to
suffer from uncertainty about counterparty risk
and asymmetric information about the exposures
from trades.  But they also involve higher risk
when a counterparty defaults, as customized assets
are often not fungible; i.e., they cannot be readily
sold in the marketplace to limit losses.
This has led to the common perception that
trading in some bilateral markets together with
inadequate clearing is a major weakness in the
current financial system. As a consequence, the
political process was quick to pressure regulators
and the financial industry to design a better
infrastructure, especially for dealing with
counterparty risk issues.
1
One particularly favoured solution is to
introduce or extend central counterparty (CCP)
services for many financial trades. A CCP assumes
the counterparty risk from financial trading while
putting in place proper risk management of the
associated trading positions. More concretely,
there are two developments that will significantly
affect financial markets worldwide as well as in
Canada: first, a general move toward standardizing
OTC contracts in order to have them centrally
traded and cleared through (possibly non-
Canadian and internationally operating) CCPs;
and second, the introduction of a CCP for the
Canadian repo market through the Canadian
Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC).
This Commentary will first discuss the nature,
limits and challenges associated with CCP
clearing, before assessing whether current proposed
solutions are well designed. My conclusion is that
most of the discussion surrounding CCP clearing
appears fundamentally misguided in several ways:
first, it focuses mostly on the risk dimension, but
does not consider efficiency considerations and
incentive distortions; second, it has made netting
I would like to thank Walter Engert, Alejandro Garcia, David Longworth and Cyril Monnet for their comments on this Commentary.
Deborah D’Arcy, Nicolas Labelle and George Kormas provided very helpful background information on the repo market in Canada and the
current proposal for central counterparty clearing in this market. However, all views and material presented here are entirely my own.
1 See for example the (in)famous commitment of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh that: “[all] standardized OTC derivative contracts should be
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest.
OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements.”| 2 Commentary 329
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* I do not distinguish here between the netting of trade positions or the netting of settlement obligations deriving from those positions.
With mutlilateral netting of trade positions, it is usually required to novate the trade, which involves a substitution of the original
transactions with new transactions between different counterparties.
I consider here an example of trade exposures among three institutions to demonstrate how a CCP
clearing changes the risk associated with these exposures. The first graph shows the initial bilateral trade
exposures. Each trade is normalized to an exposure equal to $1. Counterparties B and C have an
offsetting exposure of one trade to each other, while C owes $1 to A, and A in turn owes $2 to
counterparty B arising from one and two transactions, respectively. The total gross number of
transactions and exposures is thus five and the total exposure $5.
Figure 1 : Multilateral Netting
I first look at the possibility to net exposures.
* With bilateral netting, one could erase the exposures
between B and C as they are directly off-setting. With multilateral netting, the possibility to compress
trades is larger. The net exposure of both A and C is $1 each, with A passing on the settlement of his
trade with C – which is equal to $1 – to settle one trade with B. Hence, one can net the exposures, so
that both A and C have the obligation to pay $1 to B, which is shown by the dotted arrows in the graph. 
Such netting avoids default spreading contagiously through the financial system. Without netting, if C
defaulted on its payment, A would also default if he needed $1 from C to settle his own trades with B.
As a consequence, B faces default from A on the full position of $2. But with netting, he only faces the
direct default of C, which is only $1.
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When a CCP novates the trades, it interposes itself as the counterparty to any trade among A, B and C.
Hence, the CCP is the counterparty to all five original transactions, and the three original counterparties
have no direct exposure to each other. If the CCP employs netting together with novation, it replaces the
original exposures with a netted exposure. The aggregate exposure without default is zero for the CCP.
Figure 2 : Netting and Novation through a CCP














Suppose now counterparty A defaults within the CCP arrangement and does not pay $1. As the CCP
has taken over the obligations from the trade, it now lacks $1 to settle its obligation with B.  Assuming it
has $x as a reserve from posted collateral or from its own capital, it can pay out $1+x to B which I have
assumed to be less than $2. When losses are mutualized among clearing members of the CCP, however,
they have to jointly make up these losses with additional contributions. Both survivors, B and C, have
then to contribute $(1-x)/2 to cover the losses on the original trades between A and B. In this sense, C
takes part of the loss, even though he was originally not exposed to any default risk of A.| 4 Commentary 329
C.D. Howe Institute
the main issue, resulting in calls for more
standardization and less trading of customized
assets; and third, central clearing has often been
heralded as a solution for every financial market
without assessing whether  the characteristics of a
particular market actually warrant CCP clearing.
How Does CCP Clearing Mitigate Risk
in Financial Markets?
Clearing is the process of managing the
obligations arising from a financial trade. One
often talks about a trade being (formally) cleared
only if a specialized institution, called a clearing
house, is involved.
2 The clearing process begins
with the reconciliation of the terms of trade so
that they become legally binding. This is followed
by managing the risk associated with the trade.
The main risk factor here is that a counterparty
might not honour its obligations from the trade
(counterparty risk). In such an event, the original
trade has to be re-established or replaced
(replacement cost risk). 
The most prominent tool for dealing with these
risk factors is to require collateral, often in the
form of margins in cash or securities that are
posted to secure a financial trade. But this gives
rise to additional risk, since the value of the
collateral that secures the position can fluctuate
(collateral risk). Another risk is that calls for
additional margin or collateral might not be
honoured (sometimes called liquidity risk).
Finally, clearing ends with the settlement of the
obligations by the counterparties.
When a clearing house functions as a CCP, it
replaces the original trade with two contracts, one
between the buyer and itself and another between
the seller and itself. In other words, the CCP takes
on the role of counterparty within every transaction
that it clears. Importantly, it is not involved in
trading per se, but substitutes as the counterparty
to both sides of the trade in the clearing stage. As
such, it assumes the obligations arising from the
trade against the original buyer and seller. This
process is called novation by a third-party and is
the essential nature of CCP clearing.
As a consequence, if the CCP is able to fulfil
the contract, it eliminates the idiosyncratic risk
born by a trader that his particular counterparty
may default. As the CCP takes on the obligations
from a trade, it is however itself immediately
exposed to the replacement-cost risk of a potential
counterparty default. 
To cover this risk, CCPs rely mainly on three
lines of defence. First, a CCP sets requirements for
direct membership to ensure that its members are
financially sound. Second, it requires that an
adequate amount of collateral is posted on the
original position, which is maintained until the
financial contract matures. Finally, institutions
that have direct access to the CCP (so called
clearing members) have to post contributions in a
default fund to cover any losses. Beyond these
measures, clearing members often have the
obligation to make up losses that exceed the
default fund from their own capital.
At the centre of CCP clearing is the pooling of
counterparty risk and the mutualization of any
losses due to defaults on financial transactions.
From an economics perspective, CCP clearing is a
form of diversification and mutual insurance
against default risk.
3 This directly improves the
resiliency of financial markets. Participants are
exposed only to the risk that the CCP itself may
default, but not their original counterparty. As
such, CCP clearing is often seen as a requirement
for markets where trading is anonymous as is the
case on many modern exchanges with electronic
trading platforms.
There are other services that a clearing house
can offer and are frequently, but falsely, attributed
as defining characteristics of CCP clearing. The
prime example is the multilateral netting of
positions. Through netting, offsetting positions
can cancel each other out with only the net
exposure being retained among the obligations
2 When no clearing house is involved, the trade is cleared bilaterally, with the two counterparties maintaining their post-trade relationship
entirely through their back offices.
3 See Koeppl and Monnet (2010).Commentary 329 | 5
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from a set of trades. This procedure has the
benefit that it can save on collateral requirements
since only the smaller net position needs to be
settled and, hence, secured. But more importantly,
it reduces systemic risk in a financial market. As
many different financial institutions engage in
trades with each other, a single default can set off a
chain reaction of other defaults. Netting reduces
this risk considerably by lowering the overall risk
exposure of individual clearing members.
4
The potential for such risk reduction depends,
however, on the degree of fragmentation. When
one or several CCPs offer multilateral netting for a
specific financial market or product, it is possible
that bilateral netting between counterparties
across different markets or products achieves a
higher risk reduction.
5 This provides an argument
for having only a limited number of CCPs that
clear across different markets or products. 
Some experts in the clearing industry have also
argued that a CCP cannot offer netting across all
possible financial products. There are fixed costs
associated with clearing any particular specific
financial product, and specialized financial
transactions require particular knowledge to assess
the risks involved, knowledge that is commonly
hard for third parties to access. Hence, such
customized assets are often considered impossible
to clear for CCPs. As a consequence, much of the
discussion has unfortunately shifted toward
standardization of assets in order to improve the
scope for multilateral netting within a CCP.
Formal clearing with a clearing house generates
information on prices for financial transactions
and on individual trading positions of clearing
members. Such information increases transparency
and is a prerequisite for proper regulation and
oversight of financial markets. Having better
information seems to be particularly important in
OTC markets where trading is fragmented, and
details on transaction prices are generally hard to
come by. 
Some data warehouses – often called trade
repositories – have already been set up as a
response to the turmoil in these markets during
the recent financial crisis that was partly driven by
a lack of knowledge concerning counterparty risk
exposures.
6 Making this data publicly available
could increase trading efficiency since it would
curtail market power for dealers who usually have
better information about market prices. 
Aggregating trade data is also essential for
assessing both the overall market position and the
situation of individual participants. A CCP could
use this data for a collateral policy that takes into
account not only the circumstances of individual
trades, but also the aggregate market situation.
This is important in times of a crisis, when
counterparty risk has increased and market
participants become reluctant to trade. 
Collateral requirements, if set by individual
counterparties, would increase in such a situation.
In other words, such requirements are procyclical,
worsening the stress in the market and leading to
even higher collateral demands. Here, a CCP
could be a stabilizing force by making its collateral
policy contingent on general market conditions,
effectively breaking such a vicious margin cycle.
7
Another important aspect of CCP clearing is
that it ensures uniform risk management within
markets. Many commentators have pointed out
that OTC trades are quite frequently
uncollateralized or not sufficiently collateralized
relative to what would be considered appropriate
4 Netting need not be offered, however, within a CCP. For example, in some payment systems, netting takes place without settlement
guarantees. And historically, netting was offered even without a formal clearing house, in the form of ring netting. For more on this, see
Kroszner (1995) or Monnet (2010). Even when markets are under severe stress, netting can work quite effectively without a CCP. After the
Lehman failure in 2008, an emergency round of compressions on OTC transactions was conducted among market participants and new net
positions were established that reduced considerably the risk of contagion. For more on this, see IMF (2010).
5 See Duffie and Zhu (2009).
6 For example, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) has taken on the function of a global trade repository and
information warehouse for OTC derivatives.
7 For a more detailed discussion on margin, collateral and haircut policies, see Longworth (2010).| 6 Commentary 329
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within a formal clearing arrangement. As a
consequence, collateral requirements and, hence,
costs of collateral will certainly rise with the
introduction of mandatory CCP clearing.
8
But the current lack of collateralization need
not necessarily be a symptom of savings on
collateral costs or of myopia about the risks
involved with trading. One could also interpret it
as a sign that many trades are indirectly secured
through market discipline, an argument pursued
below. With netting, however, only a net exposure
remains for the counterparties, which allows for a
reduction in collateral – only a net margin is
required – to secure the risk exposures. Hence, a
CCP offering netting could also reduce collateral
costs for market participants.
9
To summarize, a CCP reduces the risk and
uncertainty that obligations arising from financial
trades may not be settled. But through its risk
management regime, a CCP also redistributes the
risk and the costs from any default. Notwithstanding
the reduction in risk, one needs to realize that a
CCP can be costly in the form of additional
collateral requirements. Hence, safety and efficiency
arguments must be evaluated jointly when
considering whether to introduce a CCP for a
particular market. But this necessitates a shift
away from a discussion about risk and its
allocation within the market toward a consideration
of the costs and benefits of clearing with a CCP.
Since these costs and benefits will vary across
different markets, it is imperative to distinguish
CCP clearing in different segments of the
financial market. 
I will next evaluate the case for a CCP in OTC
derivative markets, before shifting the discussion
to repo markets for short-term lending. 
CCP Clearing for OTC Derivatives
Even before the default of Lehman Brothers in 
the fall of 2008, policymakers were worried about
the potential for systemic risk in the OTC
derivatives market. In particular, credit derivatives
such as credit default swaps (CDS) were singled
out as a ticking time bomb. This fear materialized
when AIG ran into trouble meeting additional
margin requests to secure the immense portfolio
of CDS contracts it had issued on counterparties
such as Lehman.
The OTC derivatives market is large compared
to the trading of derivatives on exchanges,
outstripping the latter by about five to one.
10 The
most important segment by far of the OTC
derivatives market is interest rate derivatives,
followed by commodity and foreign-exchange-
related derivatives transactions. It seems, therefore,
unfortunate that the discussion concerning CCP
clearing in OTC derivatives has focused so much
on credit derivatives, which make up a non-negligible,
but rather small size of the overall market.
Nonetheless, this segment played an important
role during the recent financial crisis due to the
fact that trading is primarily dominated by
financial institutions and dealers. In other
segments, both commercial entities and financial
institutions are involved in trades with the latter
taking up a large share of transactions. 
The size of the OTC derivatives market, the
large exposures involved and the causes of the
economic crisis certainly justify a hard look at
how to improve risk management in this market
segment. I will discuss here only how CCP
clearing for OTC derivatives markets could be
improved in general without looking at the
specific types of contracts being traded in these
8 A related issue is that many financial institutions, especially dealers, re-use collateral they receive from counterparties to fulfil their collateral
requirements arising from their own trading. This process is called re-hypothecation and is a way to save on costly collateral. It can lead to a
suboptimal level of collateral in the market, thereby making markets more fragile. The Lehman failure is a case in point, where clients
withdrew their trading – and with it, their collateral – so that the investment bank could not meet its own collateral requirements as 
re-hypothecation was no longer available as a source of cheap, short-term funding. 
9 Koeppl and Monnet (2008) show, however, that a third-party is necessary for posting collateral to secure against two-sided risk that a
counterparty could become insolvent. In such a case, netted collateral does not cover the principal counterparty exposure from a trade. 
A CCP can resolve this problem by acting as an independent third party holding collateral in escrow for both parties to the trade.
10 This somewhat overstates the relative size of the OTC derivatives market as exchange-traded derivatives have a larger potential for netting.Commentary 329 | 7
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markets. My main point is that it is necessary to
include customized derivatives in CCP clearing.
While this challenges conventional thinking, 
I argue that it is indeed feasible but requires a 
move from the narrow view of operational risk-
management to the broader consideration of the
economic benefits that arise from CCP clearing.
Feasibility of CCP Services
Exchanges for option and futures trading such as
the Montreal Exchange use or own a CCP to carry
out the clearing of trades. So, why have CCPs not
been introduced in the far larger OTC market?
Contracts traded on an exchange are standardized.
Crucial features such as the underlying asset, the
delivery time or the price at which a transaction is
executed are fixed. This implies that the contract
itself is fungible: it can be replaced at any time in
the market. 
The economic terms of OTC derivatives
contracts are by their very nature often customized
to the needs of the counterparty, which reduces
their fungibility and makes it harder to exactly
replace a transaction.
11 Of course, the range of
products and counterparties will also be much
broader than with standardized trading on an
exchange where there are strict requirements on
who can trade what contract. This ultimately
implies that the underlying risk in OTC trades is
much higher and harder to assess.
One can even argue that the form of clearing
itself distinguishes trades on an exchange from
OTC trades. While the former – as part of the
trading – pre-determines a clearing procedure (for
example, through a CCP), bilaterally negotiated
transactions such as OTC trades always include a
choice of how to clear.
12 In this sense, an OTC
trade is customized when it comes to clearing –















Figure 4 : OTC Derivatives: Amounts Outstanding and Share of Financial Institutions
Source: BIS (2010).
11 Customization here refers exclusively to the economic terms of a derivative contract. Derivatives can also be customized with respect to 
their legal and operational terms. There seems to be wide agreement, however, that derivatives should be standardized with respect to these
later aspects.
12 This important distinction was first formalized by Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2009).| 8 Commentary 329
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13 There is a grey zone of exchange-traded derivatives also being OTC-traded.  This situation arises, for example, when a financial institution
cannot carry out a trade during exchange hours and enters into a deal after hours. It can also arise in financial engineering where several
exchange-traded contracts are combined to create a new derivative. In both scenarios, risk tends to be transparent and fungibility ensured,
but the transaction could easily be customized along several additional dimensions.
14 See, for example, Canadian OTC Derivatives Working Group (2010).
15 See Hull (2010) for an excellent exposition of this argument. There may still be a problem, however, if some financial institutions lack the
expertise to continuously value some of their transactions. This has led to a push toward requiring financial institutions to develop such
methods with the requirement of making them available to market regulators.
16 The discussion here is again related to the theoretical work of Koeppl and Monnet (2010) on CCP clearing for OTC markets.
choice for the counterparties. This implies that
counterparties need an incentive to submit an
OTC derivatives contract to a clearing house for
formal clearing independent of the contract itself
being customized or not.
13
The general push for more standardization in
the derivatives market has culminated in eliciting
a commitment from dealers to submit a large
percentage of trades, both in value and volume, to
central trading platforms and, hence, to formal
clearing. To enforce this commitment, regulators
intend to levy additional capital charges for non-
CCP cleared derivatives transactions. Such capital
charges would certainly prevent dealers from
making derivatives transactions slightly “non-
standard” to avoid central clearing. Once contracts
are more standardized and centrally traded,
netting would be facilitated and a CCP could
readily offer the benefits from novation and
mutualization since derivatives trades tend to 
be fungible.
Customized derivatives will nonetheless still
play an important future role in financial markets.
Indeed, it is very likely that future threats to the
financial system will arise exactly in this area.
After all, the economic crisis can be linked to
highly customized derivatives. One possibility of
minimizing such a threat would be to discourage
their use. However, it is far from clear that this
would be efficient. Customization is important,
especially for non-financial institutions that have
particular hedging needs. Hence, large benefits
from customization are likely to disappear once
dealers and investment banks move out of 
this market. 
Is it worth paying this price for less risk? The
answer to this question points to a classic trade-off
between stability and efficiency. But as I argue
next, CCP clearing and customized contracts need
not rule each other out – a crucial point that is
largely missing from the current debate about
clearing OTC derivatives.
14
Customization, Risk Reduction and 
Risk Allocation
When customized derivatives are hard to value
due to the specific terms of their transactions, a
third-party CCP often cannot determine the
current market price of the derivative. The CCP
would then not be able to set an appropriate 
so-called variation margin that could control the
risk position for the counterparties over time.
Conventional wisdom suggests that clearing
customized derivatives then becomes all but
impossible. Experts argue, however, that this
problem can be solved by requiring the
counterparties to supply a valuation model when
clearing the derivatives contract with a CCP.
15
This would enable the CCP to calculate appropriate
margins over time that are acceptable to the
counterparties – according to their own valuation
models – in controlling their mutual exposure.
While this is an important idea to pursue
further, it still focuses entirely on replacement cost
risk. But the economics of CCP clearing are based
on insuring against counterparty failure. At its
heart, novation simply pools and diversifies
counterparty risk.
16 But novating a trade in a
customized derivative need not involve a guarantee
of its terms, meaning replacing the exact trade in
the event of a default. It really means insuring the
expected risk of a counterparty’s bankruptcy – not
the risk of any particular derivative contract
failing. And this admittedly implies a fundamental
shift in the way how we think about CCP clearing.Commentary 329 | 9
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For a CCP to offer such insurance, it would
need to calculate initial margins according to the
overall risk of a member’s bankruptcy. Since this
risk is pooled, such a margin would cover the joint
exposures among all clearing members against
counterparty risk in a particular market segment
or class of derivative contracts. Hence, CCP
clearing looks very much like a mutual insurance
scheme where premiums in the form of initial
margins cover potential losses among the members
of the scheme. 
Importantly, this insurance neither relies on
multilateral netting of positions, nor does it
require incentives to discourage the trading of
such derivatives. Indeed, it would add additional
value and stability to the OTC market of
customized derivatives as it diversifies against
counterparty risk.
Of course, novation of customized derivatives
would necessarily leave some risk exposure
uncovered.
17 In case of a default, the CCP would
not necessarily pay out the full current value of
any trade it insures. The margins would not have
been designed to cover the potentially high
replacement cost of a customized trade under all
circumstances (so-called tail risk). Instead, the
settlement payout on every performing contract
within a class of transactions would be reduced by
a certain percentage to cover the default losses the
CCP incurs. Hence, all contracts will face what
looks like a deductible when defaults occur.
18
The bottom line for clearing customized
derivatives is thus to look at the counterparty risk
and not the replacement-cost risk specific to a
transaction. As a consequence, initial margins
become more important relative to variation
margins that fluctuate with changes in the
replacement-cost risk. This requires the CCP to
mainly assess overall counterparty default risk as
opposed to the market conditions that determine
risk exposures with respect to individual
transactions. Of course, market conditions also
drive cyclical variations in counterparty risk and
expected payouts from derivatives contracts –
unless the CCP were to change margins in
response to these variations.
19
Inefficient risk allocation further complicates
matters in the OTC market for customized
derivatives. As large dealers run most of this
market, they have considerable market power and
are likely to ignore the gains from customization
relative to the risk involved. It has been shown
20
that with such market power there is too little
volume in trades with a high gains-to-risk ratio
and too much volume in other trades.
A CCP could be helpful in correcting this
inefficiency by using margin requirements that
differ from customization gains. The major
problem with such an approach is that financial
institutions do not necessarily have an incentive to
submit OTC transactions for formal clearing if
the costs are too high. A well-designed CCP,
however, could offer benefits from clearing –
through novation, as discussed above – that could
give an incentive for counterparties to submit
these trades for formal clearing, even if it involves
a cost in the form of higher margin requirements.
Still, it is pivotal here that the CCP can observe
at least some proxies for the market power of
dealers and for the risk and gains involved in
particular transactions. A CCP could rely on data
about pricing and volume of contracts by dealers.
Also distinguishing trades with respect to the
counterparty involved could be a possibility. For
17 Indeed, if a CCP started to guarantee trades in customized derivatives, it would become necessary to re-allocate losses further among clearing
members. The members will be reluctant to take on this exposure as losses from such transactions are hard to assess and concerns of moral
hazard are likely to be important.
18 Technical default when the counterparty is solvent but does not fulfil its obligations from the trade according to the negotiated terms also
would not be covered. But clearing houses have different mechanisms to discourage such defaults, such as fines or loss of membership.
19 CCP clearing would then entail a pro-cyclical component. This however might not be acceptable from a macroprudential point of view, as it
would reduce financial stability. See, for example, CFGS (2010).
20 See again Koeppl and Monnet (2010).| 10 Commentary 329
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example, speculative trades by hedge funds could
be treated differently than transactions by large
corporate customers, which presumably are for
hedging purposes.
To conclude, the policy debate should move
away from requiring more standardization to
discussing proper ways of organizing clearing in
the customized derivatives market. Of course,
CCP clearing has technical limitations in that it is
hard to clear every single product according to its
exact specifications. Nonetheless, one can imagine
that a CCP could offer clearing of specific derivative
classes even though their terms are fairly specialized.
After all, financial institutions engage in managing
risk for such positions, and it is not clear why a
specialized entity such as a clearing house could
not do likewise along the lines I have described. 
Simply requiring more standardization does not
address risk and stability in a crucial market for
risk transfer, especially once one realizes that it is
trivial to circumvent mandatory CCP clearing of
standardized contracts. 
High capital charges on customized, non-
centrally cleared derivatives transactions might
provide some incentives for dealers to move
toward standardized contracts that are CCP-
cleared – but at the expense of losing the benefits
from using customized derivatives. However, this
concern ignores that it is actually beneficial and
feasible to control risk in customized contracts
through central clearing. A more sensible debate
among policymakers, industry and academics,
therefore, must focus on how to clear customized
derivatives and, hence, on improving stability in
this important market segment.
Market Discipline and the Cost of Collateral
Assessing the cost and adverse incentives of
clearing through a CCP has often been pushed to
the background. The reason is that considerations
of  market failure related to risk-taking and
improper risk management have played, perhaps,
too prominent a role in the wake of the financial
crisis. Many observers point out that there is often
not enough collateral posted to fully secure OTC
derivatives transactions, which is commonly seen
as a sign of financial institutions taking on too
much counterparty risk.
21 The reasons are readily
identified as inadequate collateral management,
imperfect information about counterparty risk, or
a myopic and socially inefficient motive to save on
collateral costs. 
But a significant part of OTC trading is based
on long-term, repeated relationships, often
intermediated or directly carried out between
large dealers. Hence, lower collateral postings
could be an indirect consequence of market
discipline governing some transactions. Monitoring
among large financial institutions and maintaining
a reputation as a good counterparty limit risk-
taking in general and thus can function as an
alternative to collateral for securing a trade. CCP
clearing, with collateral deemed necessary to cover
the risk in a trade, would then be a mere
substitute – and a costly one for such monitoring.
But more damaging, one could face the
unintended consequence of  moral hazard in the
behaviour of market participants when they
engage in trades that are backed by a CCP. This
could arise not only because losses are insured, but
also because CCP clearing could upset peer
monitoring as a disciplining device in long-term
bilateral trading relationships. 
This situation suggests an important trade-off
that has been routinely overlooked. Collateral can
basically serve two functions: as an incentive
device to decrease risk-taking or as an insurance
device against counterparty default. A CCP can
save on collateral since it provides cheaper
insurance in the form of novation and
mutualization of losses. But a CCP needs to rely
more heavily on collateral to limit incentives for
risk-taking. Hence, collateral requirements might
very well increase significantly with CCP clearing
as pointed out by some large dealers.
21 See IMF (2010).Commentary 329 | 11
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The International Dimension
Several big clearing houses plan to, or already
have, introduced CCP services for OTC derivatives
that are traded worldwide. Most of these clearing
houses are associated with leading international
exchanges.
22 As I have pointed out, the efficiency
of insurance against counterparty risk as well as
the reduction of systemic risk decreases with the
number of CCPs within a market and across
different instruments. This understanding has led
to suggestions that the number of clearing houses
offering CCP clearing for OTC derivatives should
be fairly small, even though this will increase
operational risk and concentrate counterparty risk
in a few systemically important parts of the
financial market infrastructure.
The market for OTC derivatives in Canada is
relatively small, and many of the leading Canadian
financial institutions trade such derivatives
worldwide with a wide variety of international
counterparties. From an international perspective,
it is thus questionable whether it is viable to create
a Canadian CCP that clears Canadian dollar
denominated trades or trades that involve only
Canadian counterparties. Also, large Canadian
institutions already have a strong incentive to join
internationally operating clearinghouses for OTC
derivatives in order to stay attractive as a counterparty
in the international financial market place.
23
Some commentators have worried that without
a Canadian CCP there would be a problem of
access for Canadian institutions to proper
clearing. However, some large Canadian banks are
already general clearing members with non-Canadian
clearing houses and could provide intermediated
access for Canadian institutions that would view
direct membership as too costly.
24
Still, a common oversight problem would occur.
Canadian institutions would increasingly be exposed
to foreign counterparty and infrastructure risk.
Spillovers from foreign capital markets would be
an increased probability. This problem would be
compounded if Canadian regulators did not have
a direct influence on proper risk-management
regulations and oversight of systemically important
infrastructure located outside Canada. However,
experience with crucial international market
infrastructures such as the Continuously-Linked-
Settlement Bank for foreign exchange settlement
and the success in harmonizing regulation within
the framework of the Committee for Payment and
Settlement Systems (CPSS) which is run by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provide
reason to believe that coordinating oversight
responsibilities across different jurisdictions 
is not impossible.
A CCP for the Canadian Repo Market
The Structure of the Short-term 
Financing Market
Markets where financial institutions allocate
liquidity and provide short-term funding to each
other are considered vital for the proper
functioning of a financial system. These markets
are by their very nature bilateral in the sense that
two counterparties directly engage in providing
short-term loans to each other. They are also
considered systemically important as any
disruption to these markets would cause severe
illiquidity and reduced market-making activity
that could ultimately feed into large price
movements and widespread defaults. As such,
22 ICE Credit Clear, LCH.clearnet and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) are already offering OTC derivatives clearing.
23 There could be an intermediate solution where multiple clearing houses are linked and interoperable. However, it is not now clear how such a
structure would function, especially with the transfer and usage of collateral across different CCPs, as well as the allocation of losses among
clearing members of different CCPs.
24 Also, a Canadian CCP would most likely have relatively broad membership across financial institutions in Canada. Broad membership
implies a wide variety of institutions, differing in size and risk profile, the features clearing houses worry about when negotiating default-fund
contributions from their members. Larger and safer institutions would presumably be less willing to supply capital to a clearing house that
has such an extended membership structure.| 12 Commentary 329
these markets are viewed as core funding markets
that need to function continuously for the
financial system to be resilient.
25
There are three key markets for short-term
funding. In the interbank market, large financial
institutions provide uncollateralized loans to each
other – mostly on an overnight basis to allocate
funds for end-of-day settlement of obligations. 
In the repo market, participation among
financial institutions is more widespread.
Borrowing is collateralized and the terms of the
loan can be up to one year. It is useful to distinguish
between two different functions of this market. A
general collateral repo primarily serves short-term
cash financing needs. The general collateral repo
derives its name from the fact that the lender is
willing to accept any collateral from a class or
basket of assets. In contrast, the special collateral
repo market concerns the lending of cash against
pre-specified collateral. Here, the function is often
to finance a particular position for a dealer in the
underlying security. It is also used to settle
transactions in this security.
The other, less important, short-term funding
market concerns securities lending against
collateral (usually in the form of cash), which is
different from repo markets in that the legal
ownership of the security does not change hands.
26
This market is usually dominated by institutions
such as pension funds or insurance companies
that try to achieve an extra return on their long-
term security portfolio. 
The Current Canadian Derivatives Clearing
Corporation (CDCC) Proposal
Repos as a short-term funding source have steadily
increased in popularity globally and have become
the main funding vehicle for many dealers and
brokers. They view repos as a convenient source of
financing for their trading and inventory of
securities because of their low transaction costs
and relatively standardized terms. In Canada,
however, the repo market is less significant for two
reasons. First, institutional investors perceive
Canadian banks as extremely safe, making
traditional unsecured wholesale deposits an
attractive alternative short-term investment.
Second, Canada lacks the infrastructure that
facilitates repo transactions.
The latter point became apparent during the
recent global economic crisis, when the Canadian
repo market experienced periods of stress.
Interestingly, this was seemingly not related to
concerns about the quality of the collateral or the
counterparties involved, but rather to an increased
demand for repo funding. Banks and dealers in
the repo market tried to protect against too much
leverage on their balance sheet by declining to
take on more repo transactions, which usually
have low profit margins. This raised concerns
about the general availability of repo funding,
causing the market to become illiquid.
The financial industry was quick to point out to
policymakers that the Canadian repo market
lacked a proper infrastructure, but needed to be
considered as a potential core funding market. As
a result, the Investment Industry Association of
Canada asked CDCC to develop CCP clearing for
the domestic repo market. CDCC’s initial
suggestion concerns only special collateral repos
using specific Canadian government debt as
collateral. But CDCC is also working on
providing clearing for general collateral repos,
which would allow more efficient netting of repo
transactions. Under this scenario, it is envisioned
that CDCC would first novate the trades and
then net the obligations arising from such repos
rather than netting the positions in specific
repos.
27 It is still open, however, how the baskets
C.D. Howe Institute
25 See Fontaine, Selody and Wilkins (2009).
26 For excellent expositions on repo markets, see Fleming and Garbade (2004) and Reid (2007).
27 The service FinNet offered by the Canadian settlement provider and securities depository CDS allows only position netting which often
cannot be used with repo financing as the collateralor the length of financing differs across repo transactions. CDCC plans here to 
transform term repos with a maturity longer than one day into multiple overnight repos, which then can be used to net obligations across
different maturities.Commentary 329 | 13
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
When a CCP clears repos, it usually does not retain the security that functions as collateral for the
transaction. The CCP also splits the transaction into its two formal parts, a cash trade and a forward
transaction. Since the cash portion of the repo does not involve any risk, the CCP will then employ its
risk management only with respect to the forward position, requiring margin to secure the exposures of
both parties with respect to the forward portion of the transaction. It is important that the margin is
posted by both parties, as there can be circumstances where the repo lender has no incentive to return
the security to settle the repo transaction.
* From an accounting perspective, such a repo transaction is sometimes called financial as compared to a sale repo where the security is
taken off the repo lender’s balance sheet.











Settlement of Repo Transaction
$10mn – Haircut + Interest
Security
Box 2: Repo and Reverse Repo Transactions
A repurchase agreement (repo) is a contract to sell and subsequently repurchase securities at a specific
date and price. A reverse repurchase agreement (reverse repo) is simply the mirror image of a repo. These
transactions can be decomposed into two separate transactions. For a repo, the borrower sells the security
to the lender against cash. In the example, the value of the transaction is $10 million. At the same time,
the borrower sells a forward contract to the lender, agreeing to purchase the same security at a future 
date at a pre-specified price. This price includes the interest agreed in the repo transaction to be paid by
the borrower.
While the security usually remains on the balance sheet of the seller/borrower,
* the legal ownership
changes hand at the start of a repo transaction, putting the security up as collateral with a high seniority
for the lender. The security can thus be seized in case of a default by the borrower. This exposes the
lender to price risk on the collateral, which is usually covered by a margin – or haircut – on the collateral
exchanged. The haircut is set to cover the risk that the market value of the collateral declines over the
term of the repo. The actual amount of cash exchanged (here $10 million) is reduced by this haircut.| 14 Commentary 329
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for collateral will be structured, even though it
appears that only high-quality public debt would
be allowed as collateral in any of the repos cleared
by CDCC.
Are CCP Services Necessary for 
Repo Markets?
There are two potential reasons causes for repo
markets to shut down during a crisis: counterparty
risk and so-called rollover risk. Counterparty risk,
however, is limited when collateral is of high
quality and very liquid. This is usually the case
with special collateral repos, which normally use
“on-the-run” – heavily traded and, hence, usually
recently issued – government debt as collateral.
Here, collateral is of good quality, making potential
losses from a counterparty insolvency small. 
Furthermore, repo transactions are mostly
short-term, limiting the price and liquidity risks
associated with the collateral. Nonetheless, these
risk factors might play a bigger role with general
collateral repos, where the collateral can be of a
different and lower quality, especially if proper
haircuts are not applied. Also, when netting is
involved in general repos, the collateral basis to
secure transactions is smaller, given the uncertainty
about the actual collateral held for a transaction.
This uncertainty can increase the stress in the repo
market during a crisis.
Rollover risk, however, plays a more important
role. Since repos are short-term financing tools,
they need to be rolled over quite frequently. If
market participants expect liquidity to be low in
the future, as uncertainty about counterparty risk
mounts, they are less willing to lend out short-term
funds for two reasons. First, if they, themselves,
need liquidity in the short-run, they might have
difficulty procuring it. And, second, the likelihood
of default increases when a counterparty, even
though solvent, cannot fulfil its obligations due to
the impossibility of rolling over a loan. Consequently,
there can be a market breakdown purely as a result
of a coordination failure when financial institutions
hoard liquidity because they expect that they will
be unable to obtain such liquidity when they need
it, themselves.
The Bank of Canada, as the ultimate provider
of liquidity in the Canadian financial system, has
deemed repo markets a key sector that needs to
function continuously in order not to destabilize
the entire financial sector. Hence, at the height 
of the economic crisis the Bank of Canada
supplied ample excess liquidity to short-term
funding markets, taking pressure off the repo
market as well. 
But this raises an important question. If the
main problem is one of coordination failure rather
than addressing primary or secondary systemic
counterparty risk, why do we need a formal
clearing solution, especially in a market where the
central bank stands ready in times of a crisis?
One  argument is that a CCP is a permanent
solution that ensures liquidity in the market,
based on the industry itself bearing any costs of
possible market disruptions. In reality, however, a
central bank backing the market is an ad hoc
solution that might create adverse incentives in
terms of risk-taking and peer monitoring. But this
seems a strange distinction, as a central bank would
invariably also back a CCP as an institution that is
too large to fail.
28
Of course, some benefits would derive from
novation. A CCP would provide insurance against
collateral risk and ensure settlement associated
with the repo transaction. It could also enforce
proper risk management in the form of haircuts.
Both arguments apply especially to the general
collateral repo market where more risky collateral
tends to be posted. 
In times of general market stress, the prices of
such collateral can vary widely, and thus
28 In the US market, repo funding is largely organized as a tri-party repo. There, two custodian banks organize the collateral management of
repo positions. Most of the repos are general collateral ones with a wide variety of securities serving as collateral, including asset-backed
securities. The custodians take on large intraday exposures with respect to the collateral, as they re-shuffle it during the day to adjust for
changes in overnight and term repo financing. The economic crisis has shown this model to be a very fragile structure especially prone to
runs. It appears that the only reason to stick to such a structure or to improve upon it by moving to a (possibly government run) CCP is to
deem this approach vital in providing sufficient short-term funding to the market.Commentary 329 | 15
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counterparties might be unwilling to accept it in
the absence of a CCP guarantee. More generally, a
CCP would certainly contribute to the proper
functioning of the repo market as it enforces
proper settlement of repo transactions and deals
with technical and outright default.
29 But all these
benefits have to be set against the additional
operational costs of CCP clearing.
A far more intriguing argument could be that 
a CCP is well positioned to improve market
conditions during times of crisis. Market
participants jack up haircuts on collateral in
stressed markets as price volatility increases. This
can set off so-called margin spirals, which sharply
decrease liquidity and thus inhibit the proper
functioning of the repo market. 
A CCP could choose to keep lower haircuts
against insuring collateral risk, thereby assuming a
portion of that risk. This could maintain funding
liquidity in the market at a time when it is most
needed. The potential losses from such a policy
would then be borne by the clearing members,
which tend to be the largest financial institutions.
Other institutions indirectly participate in
funding these losses by paying clearing fees when
they are members of the CCP intermediate
clearing house. In conclusion, the case for CCPs
in the repo market seems to be far less obvious
than in the OTC derivatives market.
CCP Solutions for Other Markets
OTC derivatives and repo markets are not alone 
as cornerstones for the financial system. Other
markets have been deemed core markets. These
are markets for unsecured short-term lending,
foreign exchange markets and markets for
securities lending.
30 Surprisingly, there has not
been much discussion about improving the
clearing infrastructure for these markets. For
completeness, I offer a brief review of these markets.
Markets for Short-term Unsecured Funding
The Bank of Canada’s main instrument for
monetary policy in Canada is setting a target for
the overnight rate at which banks can refinance
themselves overnight. If one views the Bank of
Canada as the apex of the financial system, the
overnight and short-term lending markets are in
fact the most important core funding markets.
Why then has there then been no discussion about
a CCP in such markets, where lending is unsecured?
The answer I believe is straightforward. If these
markets freeze up due to liquidity hoarding and
uncertainty about counterparty quality, a central
bank will be forced to provide funding through
special (term) repo transactions. The recent
economic crisis has shown that in such a situation
a central bank would have no choice but to
become the de facto central counterparty to all
short-term lending among financial institutions. 
Furthermore, as monetary policy is
implemented by a so-called channel system, large
banks can directly borrow from the Bank of
Canada, albeit at a penalty rate, at a special
lending facility – called the Standing Liquidity
Facility (SLF) – to satisfy any overnight
borrowing. It is in that sense that the Bank of
Canada can be seen as implicitly providing a 
back-up in a crisis situation, making it the de
facto CCP in times of extreme market distress.
31
Foreign Exchange Markets
I have pointed out earlier that OTC derivatives
markets could benefit from proper clearing,
29 For example, money market funds would receive additional insurance through CCP clearing so that they would not fall short of maintaining
their fund value at par. Hence, CCP clearing could induce a thicker repo market, especially in Canada where many institutional investors
prefer short-term, unsecured lending to the larger banks over repo transactions.
30 See again Fontaine, Selody and Wilkins (2009). These markets comprise the unsecured interbank market, which is relatively small in Canada,
and the more important private money markets (such as bankers’ acceptances) where banks obtain short-term refinancing.
31 Of course, this implies that the Bank of Canada is exposed to credit risk that it cannot take on under its current mandate. But it is hard to
see how not taking on credit risk could be enforced in a crisis situation, as recent experience – especially in Europe – has demonstrated.| 16 Commentary 329
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independent of the underlying asset for the
derivative. Interestingly, many observers have
suggested excluding foreign exchange swaps and
other derivatives from the current proposals. For
one thing, they argue that foreign exchange swaps
are usually very short-term and concern the
exchange of principals in the form of cash. Hence,
the volatility and risk involved in crisis times are
supposed to be limited.  In addition, there exists
already some infrastructure such as the
Continuously-Linked-Settlement Bank that
appropriately deals with counterparty risk and
which functioned well in the recent financial crisis.
Securities Lending
Securities lending improves the liquidity in many
asset markets and aids the price-finding process by
supporting short sales. Large long-term asset
management companies are heavily involved in
lending securities against cash collateral to market-
makers and dealers in order to seek additional
profits on their securities portfolios. 
However, some observers point out that the
market for securities lending is fragmented and
dominated by large intermediaries such as
custodian banks. This not only leads to decreased
price transparency, but also to some concentration
of counterparty risk. Hence, in this market the
foremost gains are likely to arise from improvements
to the trading infrastructure and more trade
information. Furthermore, securities lending
could always be structured as a repo transaction
from an economic point of view, even though
there are different legal implications.
These considerations might explain why there is
currently no real discussion about introducing
formal clearing services for securities lending. For
example, within the CDCC’s current proposed
CCP solution, securities lending can occur only
within a formal, special collateral repo transaction.
This means that lenders such as insurance
companies or pension funds seeking formal
clearing for securities repo lending have to use
intermediaries that are direct clearing members of
CDCC. In the future, there might be pressure to
expand the set of counterparties that can access
CDCC directly as clearing members.
Conclusion
The telling tale of the financial crisis has been
counterparty risk, especially in markets where
trading is bilateral with directly negotiated terms
such as in OTC derivatives and short-term
funding markets. The absence of formal clearing
arrangements has been identified as the main
reason such markets did not function properly at
the height of the crisis. As a response, regulators
have hailed CCP solutions as a necessary condition
to improve the resilience of financial markets.
For OTC derivatives markets, much of the
policy discussion has focused on how formal
clearing can provide better information, reduce
systemic risk in the market and ensure that trades
are properly collateralized. Without doubt these
benefits would arise, but they are not necessarily
the core elements of CCP clearing. In fact, the
major benefits would be the diversification of
counterparty risk through novation and the
redistribution of such risk through mutualization
of losses.
The current focus on non-core elements of CPP
clearing is unfortunate for two reasons. Too much
attention is being paid to standardizing derivative
contracts in order to increase the efficiency of
netting arrangements, lowering systemic risk as a
consequence. But customized contracts can also
provide important benefits, especially to non-
financial counterparties. Furthermore, such
derivatives were at the centre of the recent crisis
and arguably are an important source of potential
future financial instability. Hence, it is necessary
to find innovative solutions for moving customized
derivatives to formal CCP clearing arrangements.
CCP clearing has, of course, technical
limitations. Mainly, it is hard to clear every single
product according to its exact specifications.
Nonetheless, one can imagine that a CCP could
offer clearing of specific derivative classes, even
though their terms are fairly specialized. Designing
ways of centrally clearing customized derivatives
should be a key priority. One route is enablingCommentary 329 | 17
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CCPs to use the proprietary valuation models of
its members to value contracts. An alternative,
innovative route is to move away from designing
CCPs as guarantors of financial transactions to
CCPs offering true counterparty risk insurance. 
Equally important, the costs of a CCP solution
have been pushed back in the discussion in favour
of systemic risk considerations. Many sources have
pointed out that there is often not enough collateral
posted to fully secure OTC derivatives transactions,
which is commonly interpreted as a sign of
financial institutions taking on too much risk. 
But thinking about a CCP providing novation
as its core function helps to frame the discussion
in a very different light. That many derivatives
transactions are not fully collateralized need not
be a sign of excess risk-taking in the market.
Indeed, to a certain degree, it can be attributed to
peer monitoring and reputation as an incentive
device. Such market discipline will decrease when
a CCP offers insurance against counterparty risk
and, as a consequence, needs to increase collateral
to contain moral hazard. In short, CPP solutions
entail costs in the form of higher collateral
requirements, and these must be balanced against
any associated benefits.
In Canada, the development of a CCP solution
for the repo market has made more progress than
for OTC markets, most likely because the relevant
market can be more clearly defined. But this is
still surprising as the benefits of CCP clearing are
less obvious. As all exposures are automatically
collateralized by design, benefits are not really
related to counterparty, but more to liquidity and
collateral risk. Both tend to be small, however, if
collateral is of good quality (e.g., government
bonds) and appropriate haircuts are applied,
making the case for a CCP solution less
compelling from a pure risk perspective.
The main argument for a CCP approach must
thus be based on the possibility of a coordination
failure when, in times of a crisis, financial
institutions cannot roll over short-term funding or
collateral requirements and haircuts are tightened.
But, even in the absence of a CCP, a central bank
could still play a fundamental role by intervening
in such situations and providing sufficient liquidity
support in the short-term funding market. Hence,
while a case for CCP for the repo market seems to
be far less clear than for the OTC market, this
solution can be seen as a market-based solution to
this coordination problem. Such a solution levies
the costs of market disruption on the financial
sector as much as possible and thus reduces the
likelihood of a central bank intervention.
As CCP clearing gains in importance, we will
face institutions that are automatically too large to
fail. This raises the spectre of a central bank having
to provide a back-stop to such institutions, which
leads to a moral hazard problem. Furthermore, such
an approach runs counter to most current central
bank mandates that prohibit taking on credit risk.
Hence, a discussion is needed of how much
aggregate, through-the-cycle risk the financial
sector and CCPs can shift to public institutions. 
Finally, CCP solutions will take on an
increasingly international character with the
continuing integration of global markets. This
poses the challenge of how to regulate these
institutions across different jurisdictions and of
how to limit risk spillover that is propagated
across different countries through the clearing
infrastructure. While some countries have made
progress – see for example the creation of the
European Systemic Risk Board – more effort is
needed to coordinate macroprudential regulation
and oversight.References
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